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CIVIL CODE REVISION IN THE
NETHERLANDS: A SURVEY OF ITS SYSTEM
AND CONTENTS, AND ITS INFLUENCE ON
DUTCH LEGAL PRACTICE
Arthur S. Hartkamp*
§ 1.

INTRODUCTION

The invitation in 1975 to describe the developments concerning the revision of the Dutch Civil Code came at a propitious time. Due to some spectacular events in the past years
(see § 2) the revision program, which had seemed to lead a
slumbering existence in the sixties, regained full attention
and in fact came substantially closer to its realization.
To begin with, there is a brief survey of the revision
program and of the present state of affairs (§ 2), followed by a
discussion of some more substantial questions, i.e., the system of the new Code (§ 3) and a few important innovations
which it contains, compared to the law in force. Among other
things, this includes some issues which drew attention in
foreign writings (§ 4). Finally, attention will be directed to the
meaning of new Civil Code for Dutch legal development
and practice, especially to the important role played by the
courts (§ 5).

§ 2. THE REVISION PROGRAM: PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
By Royal Decree of 1947 Professor Meijers of Leyden
University, who had long been an advocate of Code revision
and who was recognized as being one of the outstanding legal
scholars of Europe, was commissioned to draft a new Civil
Code. Various serious arguments could be advanced in favor
of this commission. Our present Civil Code and Commercial
Code date from 18381 and can be considered as outdated on
* Lecturer, Amsterdam University (1968-1974); magistrate, Ministry of
Justice (with the department preparing new Civil Code).
1. It is the third Civil Code in force in the Netherlands. The first came
into being in 1809 by order of King Louis Napoleon, brother of the Emperor.
It had much in common with the French Code Napoleon, although not to
such an extent as it is generally considered. In 1811, after the incorporation
of the Netherlands into the French empire, it was replaced by the Code
Napol~on itself. Immediately after the liberation in 1813 attempts were made
to draft a national Code, which were finally crowned with success in 1838.
Apart from a number of more or less important subjects in the law of persons
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many points. This does not apply to a number of socially
weighty subjects, in regard to which radical changes were
accomplished both in the Code and in separate statutes: e.g.,
juvenile law, rent, lease, labor-contract, hire-purchase, industrial and intellectual property, company law, and so forth.
Unfortunately, however, the Dutch legislator failed to adapt
the law of property and the law of obligations to modern
standards. This omission is quite understandable when it is
realized that-not to speak of social pressure-changes can be
much more easily brought about in more or less independent
parts of the law than in such general and interdependent
parts as the law of property and the law of obligations. Here a
partial revision is often not possible without necessarily
touching upon so many other subjects, that' it either does not
arrive at any changes at all or at least not at all the changes
required.
The gap in the development of private law resulting from
this situation was subsequently filled for the greater part by
judge-made law. Undoubtedly, the most spectacular example
here is the law of torts which was almost completely a creation of the courts. Equally, in other fields, the courts have
bridged the gulf between the Code and the rapid social developments of the present century; some other examples will
be discussed later in this article. Much as this development
can be welcomed in itself, it also proved to be a fatal influence
on the legislator's unenthusiastic partial changes and their
advocates.
On the one hand, voices grew ever louder from those who
preferred to entrust the development of the law to the subtly
differentiating and more concrete approach of the courts. On
and family law (notably the law of matrimonial property), the law of succession and the law of things, this Code is largely, often even verbatim, based
upon the Code Napoleon. This does not hold true however for its system:
since the Dutch Civil Code returned to the requirement of delivery for the
transfer of property as known in Roman and ancient Dutch law, a clear
distinction has been made between the law of things and the law of obligations; consequently they are set out in the 2nd and the 3rd book respectively.
The law of succession is also included in Book 2. Besides, the Civil Code
contains a 4th book with provisions on the law of evidence and the law of
prescription. The system bears a striking resemblance to that of the Institutes of Gaius and of Justinian, and also (apart from Book 4) to the INLEIDINGE TOT DE HOLLANDSCHE RECHTS-GELEERDHEID

(Introduction to the

Dutch Jurisprudence) of 1631 by the famous Dutch lawyer Hugo de Groot
(Grotius). The Dutch Commercial Code also dates from 1838. See Mercantile

Law, text at §3 (6), infra.
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the other hand, partial revisions became increasingly
difficult: an innovation would not only have to fit into the
Civil Code, but also in the much more complicated network of
judge-made law, in which almost every provision of the Civil
Code separately and the Code as a whole are interwoven. All
this led to a situation in which the private law is unsurveyably laid down in partially obsolete Codes, many separate
statutes and a great number of judicial decisions; a situation
basically different from the intention of the Constitution
which provides (since 1798): "the civil law and the commercial
law shall be laid down by the legislator in general Codes,
subject to his power to regulate specific subjects in separate
acts" (art. 164 of the Constitution).
Professor Meijers thus got, at the already advanced age
of 67, the commission to draft a new Civil Code. How new this
Code is to be in comparison with the present one will be
discussed later on in this article. It certainly will be new as
far as the system is concerned. In the first place it will contain the contents of the present Civil Code as well as the
Commercial Code, thus returning to the situation of RomanDutch Law, in which the commercial law was never dealt
with separately from civil law. Furthermore, those parts of
private law presently contained in separate statutes will be
included in it. The Code, as intended by Meijers, will consist
of 9 books (preceded by a preliminary title):
I.

The law of persons and family law (including the
law of matrimonial property)
II. Juristic persons (associations, corporations with limited responsibility, foundations)
III. General law of the patrimony, i.e., provisions applicable to all subsequent books
IV. Law of succession
V. Property and right in rem
VI. General provisions on the law of obligations
VII. Particular contracts
VIII. Means of traffic and transport (by sea, inland waterways, air, road)
IX. Law of industrial and intellectual property
This system will be discussed in the following section (§ 3);
meanwhile the present discussion will continue with the
legislative work since 1947.
Professor Meijers began his work by consulting a great
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number of experts on many problems which were to be settled

in the new Civil Code. It was decided that 52 of the most
important subjects, especially those which had some political
implications, should be submitted to parliament with a view
to obtaining its conclusions as to the policies which should be
followed. This first phase of the work need not be discussed
here; three articles by Dainow were devoted to it.2
Although Meijers preferred to publish the draft as a
whole, the Preliminary Title and Books 1-4 together with the
Explanatory Commentary ("Toelichting") were published
separately in 1954. 3 This happened at the insistence of the
Minister of Justice Donker, a convinced advocate of the recodification, who feared that the interest in the undertaking
would flag if the first results were unduly long in forthcoming. A few months later, Meijers died suddenly. It was de4
cided that the work would be continued by a "triumvirate",
with the help of some assistants. The work on most of the
other books could be continued on the basis of the more or
less elaborated preliminary drafts of texts and commentaries,
which Meijers had already prepared.
The triumvirate published the draft of Book 5 in 19555
2. Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: the Fifty Questions, 5
AM. J. COMP. L. 595-610 (1956) (with an English translation of all questions
and conclusions); Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: General
Problems, 17 LA. L. REV. 273-93 (1957) (a discussion of questions 23, 24 and
25); Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands:Some New Developments
in Obligations and Property, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW (Legal Essays in honor of Hessel E. Yntema), 172-189 (Leyden
1961) (a discussion of questions 10, 21, 21A, 3 and 8). See text at § 4 (1-3), infra.
For the procedure with regard to these questions, as well as for the
motives which led to the revision of the Civil Code and for the procedure
followed during the initial years of the revision program, see also the three
lectures by E.M. Meijers, Le riforme du Code Civil ngerlandais,Case Law and
Codified Systems of PrivateLaw, and La rivision du Code Civil n~erlandaisin
VERZAMELDE PRIVAATRECHTELIJKE OPSTELLEN VAN E.M. MEIJERS pt. I at
150-73, 181-93, 194-204 (Leyden 1954). For other publications in foreign languages, see notes 16 and 30.
3. ONTWERP VOOR EEN NIEUW BURGERLIJK WETBOEK, TEKST EERSTE
GEDEELTE, BOEK 1-4 (1954). (Draft for a new Civil Code, Text First Part,
Books 1-4); TOELICHTING, BOEK 1-4 (Explanatory Commentary Books 1-4),
(The Hague 1954).
4. J. Drion, Professor of Civil Law at Leyden University, J. Eggens,
Advocaat-Generaalto the Hoge Raad (the Supreme Court) and F.J. de Jong,
Vice-President and later President of the Hoge Raad. In 1957 Eggens was
succeeded by G. de Grooth, Professor of Civil Law at Leyden University.
5. ONTWERP VOOR EEN NIEUW BURGERLIJK WETBOEK, TEKST TWEEDE
GEDEELTE, BOEK 5; and TOELICHTING, BOEK 5 (The Hague 1955).
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and the draft of Book 6 in 1961.6 As to Book 7, the particular
contracts, another procedure was decided upon.7 Because of
the range of subjects and the specialized knowledge required
for a number of the subjects to be dealt with in this Book, the
Minister of Justice decided to divide the material among a
number of jurists, who separately undertook to draft text and
commentary of one or more of the 20 titles. One member of
the triumvirate8 was commissioned to co-ordinate these
drafts and to determine their final formulation. The draft was
presented to the Minister in 1972. 9 Book 8 was entrusted to a
specialist in the field of maritime law.' 0 Its first part, containing general regulations for the contract of transport,
maritime law and law of inland navigation, was published in
1972.11

Deliberations in parliament of the drafts (each book is
submitted and discussed as a separate bill so that properly
speaking a Draft Civil Code does not exist) started in 1954,
when the drafts of the Preliminary Title 12 and of Books 1-4
were introduced in the Second Chamber after having been
modified by the Minister on certain points;' 3 Book 5 followed
6. ONTWERP VOOR EEN4 NIEUW BURGERLIJK WETBOEK, TEKST DERDE
GEDEELTE, BOEK 6; and TOELICHTING, BOEK 6 (The Hague 1961). For an

English translation of this book, see note 30.
7. See ONTWERP VOOR EEN NIEUW BURGERLIJK WETBOEK, TEKST VIERDE
GEDEELTE, BOEK 7 I (The Hague 1972).
8. F.J. de Jong. See information at note 4, supra.
9. See citation at note 7, supra.
10. H. Schadee, Professor at the Erasmus University, Rotterdam.
11. ONTWERP VOOR EEN NIEUW BURGERLIJK WETBOEK, TEKST VIJFDE
GEDEELTE, BOEK 8, EERSTE STUK; TOELICHTING, BOEK 8 (The Hague 1972).
12. The parliamentary discussions on this title have been postponed
until the legislative work on the Code will be brought to an end. The title
contains on the one hand provisions concerning the relation between codified
law and custom, equity and the principles of law underlying statutory provisions, and on the other hand cases in which rights and authorities may not be
exercised (notably abuse of right). See text at §5(3)(d), infra.
13. The legislative power of the Netherlands rests conjointly in the government and the States-General (parliament) which consist of two bodies, the
First Chamber and the Second Chamber. The Second Chamber (150 members,
elected directly by universal suffrage for four-year terms) may be considered
as corresponding roughly to the House of Commons of the English Parliament. Its powers comprise among others the right of amendment, which is
denied to the First Chamber. For this and other reasons, the centre of
gravity of the parliamentary discussion lies in the Second Chamber. The
subsequent discussions in the First Chamber are confined to the general
lines of the bill and therefore can be carried through much more quickly. The
procedure is identical in both chambers. After the introduction of the draft
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two years later. The draft of Book 6 was introduced unchanged in 1964. The first book was enacted in 1959, the
second in 1960, the fourth in 1969. Unfortunately, practice
has shown that much time passes between the moment that
the act is passed and its promulgation. This promulgation is
prepared by another act, called the "Invoeringswet" (the Introductory Bill) which contains (1) transitional law, (2) necessary adaptions of other Codes and statutes, 14 (3) changes
which are made in the act already passed.
An important question is whether it is possible and desirable to put into operation certain books apart from the
others. The question was positively answered in the case of
Books 1 and 2. The new maritime law (Book 8, first part) is
likewise planned to be put into effect separately; this was
already taken into account when the book was drafted in such
a way that on the one hand the draft fits into the law presently in force, and that on the other hand it can be
adapted to the new Civil Code without many difficulties.
Things are different with the remaining books, especially
Books 3, 5 and 6. These are so closely interlinked that it is
considered impossible to put them into operation separately.
It is not yet clear how this problem will be solved with Books
4 and 7. Plans exist to put into operation parts of it with
priority; 5 the remaining parts, however, will be put into
effect together with Books 3, 5 and 6.
bill a commission of the Chamber renders a Preliminary Report, which the
government answers by a Memorandum in Reply, if necessary accompanied
with a Revised Draft. Subsequently, the commission presents a final report,
followed by the discussions on the floor of the House. This procedure can vary
depending on the complexity of the matter and the amount of criticism and
suggestions of the commission or the Chamber as a whole. Thus, in the
course of parliamentary discussions on parts of the Draft Code, hearings are
held between the Minister (assisted by his civil servants or by special advisers to the government) and the Commission of the House, which can result in
further changes of the drafts. The act being passed, this whole procedure is
repeated in connection with the Introductory Act. See text at note 14, infra.
14. The number of these alterations is high. Thus, on the occasion of the
putting into operation of Book 2, more than a hundred statutes had to be
changed, apart from the necessary adaptation of the Codes.
15. With regard to Book 4 (law of succession), a draft is presently under
consideration which equates the position of illegitimate and legitimate children; besides, it purports to strengthen the position of the surviving spouse.
Title 1 of Book 7 (contract of sale) is intended to be put into effect in advance.
The possibility of putting into operation a part of the Code in advance is
considered merely as a matter of utility. Various factors are taken into
consideration, especially the practical needs, the question whether it will fit
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As to Book 1, discussions in parliament of the "Invoeringswet" started in 1965 and were concluded in 1969. The book
was put into operation on January 1, 1970.16 Preparations
for the promulgation of Book 2 started in 1970. Most probably
the parliamentary discussions will be concluded this year, so
that the book will be put into operation in 1976. Books 3, 5 and
6 have not yet made the same progress. As mentioned above,
these books have to be dealt with as a unity, which puts a
heavy burden on the Ministry of Justice and the Second
Chamber. By Memorandum in Reply the minister introduced
a Revised Draft of Books 3 and 5, in 1971 and 1972 respectively. This can be anticipated for Book 6 towards the end of
this year, if the House can finish the Preliminary Report in
time. These three books are intended to be discussed in 1977
on the floor of the Second Chamber.
Conclusion. Book 1 has been put into effect, Book 2 almost; Book 4 has been enacted but is not yet in force. Books 3,
5 and 6 are in an advanced stage of parliamentary discussion. The drafts of Book 7 and the first part of Book 8 have
been published; there are serious plans for an anticipated
promulgation of parts of those books. 17 Accordingly, it may be
said that important progress has been made. The work took
considerably longer than was envisaged at the outset, but
fortunately the fears of the active Minister Donker, that this
would cause the interest in the work to vanish, both on the
part of the politicians as well as on the part of legal science
and practice, have so far not been confirmed.
§ 3.

1.

THE SYSTEM OF THE NEW CODE

General Law of the Patrimony

The most drastic change compared to the system of the
present Civil Code-in fact also of any other codification in civil
law countries-is formed by Book 3 "General Law of the Patin with the existing law without creating too many problems, and the time
required for these legislative activities.
. 16. A French translation has been published: L. F. Ganshof en Ch. J. J.
M. Petit, NOUVEAU CODE CIVIL NPERLANDAIS: LIVRE 1, DROIT DE PERSONNES
ET DE LA FAMILLE (Deventer 1972). The consequences of this promulgation
with reference to the impact of the rest of the draft on Dutch legal practice is
discussed in §5 (1), infra.
17. On Book 9, see §3 (7), infra.
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rimony."' 8 Its principle is twofold. 19 On the one hand, corporeal and incorporeal things are considered as equivalent;
consequently, rules which are related to both categories are
brought together in one and the same book. Thus a great
number of subjects which were traditionally-since Roman
Law-treated as part of the law of things were transferred to
Book 3, such as the provisions on transfer of corporeal and
20
incorporeal things, possession, "gemeenschap" (community);
those rights in rem which can have as their object both corporeal and incorporeal things, i.e., usufruct, pledge and
mortgage; 2 ' privileges and the right of retention; finally, general definitions of "assets" and "things", 22 fruits, components
of things, limited rights, and so forth, as well as related general regulations, notably the provisions regarding the public
23
registers for registered goods.
On the other hand, in Book 3 some issues are settled
which traditionally could be found in the law of contract and
partially in the law of succession; these subjects however relate to the law of the patrimony as a whole. In the first place
this applies to the concept of the juristic act: general requirements for its validity (will, capacity); protection of parties who in good faith rely on the appearance of a valid consent; conditions and terms; the effects of a juristic act contrary to law, boni mores or public order; conversion and par18. The term "patrimony" is the translation of the Dutch word "vermogen" which comprises all subjective rights having a money value. See Lawson, Notes on Some General Problems in Terminology, in Unofficial Translation of Book 6 (Obligations), 17 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REv. 225, 237-40
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Lawson]. Thus, Book 3 contains provisions pertaining to all patrimonial relationships (to be treated in the following books).
19. Cf. MEIJERS, TOELICHTING, BOEK 1-4, 15 et seq. & 159 et seq. (1954).

20. In the draft, the new term "gemeenschap" is chosen (which can
hardly be translated) instead of the term "co-property," since the concept of
"property" in Book 5 is limited to the rights on corporeal things, while
"gemeenschap" also comprises the incorporeal things (limited rights, rights
in personam, industrial and intellectual property).
21. In the terminology of the draft "beperkte rechten" (limited rights),
since the "rights in rem" only concern corporeal things and are accordingly
set out in Book 5. See note 5, supra.
22. The more narrow concept of "zaak" (thing) indicates solely corporeal
things; the wider notion "goed" (asset) embraces incorporeal things as well.
See explanation note 20, supra. For these and other terminological problems,
see Lawson at 225-240.
23. The most important being immovable things, vessels, airplanes.
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tial nullity; defects of consent; fraud of creditors; some forms
of legal relief, ratification and convalescence. Secondly, the
law of agency, which at present forms an incoherent and
confusing part of the contract of mandate, will be laid down in
this book (with the exception of some specific rules on the
authority to act on behalf of a juristic person). Apart from
these two groups of provisions, Book 3 contains two entirely
new subjects.
First, a title is devoted to the fiduciary administration
("bewind"). It should be borne in mind that the concept of
trust is unknown to Dutch law. In practice there do exist
various forms of fiducia cum amico, which to some extent
pursue the same ends. However, since thefiducia does not fit
in with the civil law concept of property, it is suppressed in
the new Civil Code. Instead ample possibilities for fiduciary
24
administration are created.
The other new subject is formed by a number of general
provisions on actions. Several considerations have induced
this innovation. Meijers 25 felt that actions pertaining to a
person are so closely connected with subjective rights that
their adjudication must be rooted in the Civil Code. Besides,
the judge by way of coercive measure can order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff, at the latter's request, a so-called
penal sum ("dwangsom"), in case the former does not obey the
court's decision. According to Meijers, this obligation should
be included in the Civil Code, just like the stipulated penalty
by which parties themselves can create a similar incentive to
the fulfillment of a duty. The general provisions regarding
actions concern inter alia the power to require judgment
against a person who is obliged to fulfill a duty on behalf of
the plaintiff; rules regarding specific performance; the provision that the judgment can act as the deed of the juristic act
which the defendant was obliged to perform; the penal sum
26
already mentioned; and finally the prescription of actions.
24. Cf. Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: Some New Developments in Obligations and Property, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE
AND CONFLICTS LAW 185 (Leyden 1961). For the replacement of the fiducia
cum creditore, see §4 (1).
25. TOELICHTING, BOEK 1-4, 11 & 297-98 (1954).
26. Apart from incidental provisions of a procedural character, especially
those which grant certain actions in special cases, the draft of the Civil Code
will no longer interfere with the law of civil procedure. The law of evidence,
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2. Law of Succession
In the French Civil Code, the law of succession is considered as a mode of acquiring property and is therefore included in its third book. This view was followed in the Dutch
Civil Code (art. 639), which was one of the reasons 27 for putting it in the second book (Law of things, including property).28 The new Civil Code abandons this idea, because it is
one-sided. Not only does property pass to the heirs, but the
same is true of other rights in rem, possession, rights in personam, industrial and intellectual property as well as obligations. The law of succession concerns the patrimony of the
decedent as a whole. Therefore it is the subject of a separate
book (Book 4)29 situated between the General Law of the Patrimony and the books containing the various kinds of subjective patrimonial rights. These rights are arranged according
to their object: the rights in corporeal things, the rights in
personam, and the rights in the products of the mind (traditionally called the rights of industrial and intellectual property).
3.

Law of Things

The first of these categories is laid down in Book 5: the
rights in corporeal things or "rights in rem". This book includes movable and immovable things, servitudes imposed by
law, conventional servitudes, and some other rights in rem
unknown to the French Code Civil, but derived from ancient
Dutch law. As previously indicated, some rights now called
rights in rem have been transferred to Book 3, since they are
not restricted to corporeal things. These rights are desigpresently in the Civil Code (see note 1, supra) will be moved to the Code of
Civil Procedure; for this purpose a draft has already been submitted to the
Second Chamber. However, while formulating the provisions of the new Civil
Code, the consequences for civil procedure have often been taken into account, especially with regard to the burden of proof. Thus, an exception to a
principal rule often begins with the word "unless," which implies that the
person in whose interest this exception has been made, must prove its contents.
27. Another reason is to be found in the concept, originating from the
German lawyer Hahn (16th century), that the right of the heir should be
considered as a right in rem, at least as an absolute right. This view, which
cannot be discussed here, was rejected a long time ago.

28. For the difference between the systems of the French and the Dutch
Civil Code as to the law of things, see note 1, supra.
29. Cf. TOELICHTING, BOEK 1-4, 17 (1954).
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nated as "limited rights"; of this genus the rights in rem of
Book 5 constitute a species.
4. Law of Obligations
The law of obligations is contained in Books 6, 7 and the
greater part of Book 8. Book 6 contains the "general part" of
the law of obligations. However interesting a book, it shall be
discussed only briefly since an English translation was published recently. 30 By way of introduction to this translation,
H. Drion wrote a lucid survey of the contents of Book 6, its
relations to the first four titles of Book 3 of the present Dutch
Code, and the differences between the classification of these
titles and the corresponding chapters of the French Code.
Book 6 consists of 5 titles. The first title "Obligations
generally" contains provisions applying to all obligations regardless of their source. Many of these provisions are new,
such as the general provisions on natural obligations, the
greater part of those on joint obligations and plurality of
creditors, a separate chapter on default of the creditor, 3 1 and
chapters on performance and the consequences of nonperformance of obligations. There is also a chapter on liability
for damages, which applies to both contractual and tortious
liability, with the effect that a number of legal consequences
of non-performance and torts can be harmonized. 32 Moreover,
it is intended that the Revised Draft will contain a chapter
devoted to the obligations to pay a sum of money, in which
attention will be paid to the rule of nominalism, payment by
30. Unofficial Translation of Book 6 of the Draft of a new Netherlands
Civil Code, 17 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 225-74 (1970), with an introduction by H. Drion, Justice of the Hoge Raad, brother of the already mentioned
"triumvir" J. Drion, and Notes on some general problems of terminology by
F. H. Lawson. See also Lawson, 12 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1071-72 (1963); A. von
Overbeck, in 1962 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 190 et seq. (1962).
An English translation of the Explanatory Commentary on Book 6 will be
published soon.
31. This set of provisions, which follows to a large extent the rules developed by the courts, will gain considerable importance because of the abolition of the ancient rule periculum est emptoris. In the new Code the risk will
pass to the buyer at the delivery of the thing sold. Consequently, it is reasonable that the risk also passes to the buyer (and that the seller's liability is
diminished) if the delivery cannot take place as a result of circumstances
attributable to him.
32. For an example, see §4 (2). See also, Drion, Introductionto "Unofficial
Translation of Book 6", 17 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 225, 234 (1970).
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postal transfer ("giro"), statutory interest for default in the
payment of a sum of money, and debts in foreign currencies.
Title 2, called "Passing of claims and debts", also contains
many innovations, such as those with regard to subrogation,
the consequences of the transfer of claims, and the taking
over of debts and contracts. The third title is devoted entirely
to torts; some remarkable innovations are discussed below in
§ 4(6). Title 4 contains provisions on obligations from other
sources than tort or contract, namely, negotiorum gestio
(management of another's affairs), solutio indebiti (payment
of a thing not due), and the general action for unjustified
enrichment (§ 4 (5)).
Finally, title 5 is devoted to the general provisions on the
law of contract. Among the many new rules are those on
standard terms,3 3 the extent to which a party is bound to
general conditions (fixed by the other party and usually deposited at some public place) of which he did not know the
contents at the time the contract was concluded, formation of
contracts, effects against third parties of covenants concerning registered property, good faith, and unforeseen circumstances (§ 4(3)).
Although "more than half of Book 6 deals with questions
on which the present Code is silent", 34 its size is not much
larger than that of the four titles which it is to replace. The
number of articles is even smaller. In spite of its great flexibility, characteristic of this part of the law, the present law of
obligations undoubtedly belongs to the most obsolete parts of
our codified law.
5.

Special Contracts

Book 7 contains the special contracts. They are arranged
in three successive groups:3 5 (1) the contracts which lead to
the transfer of a thing (sale, exchange, loan for consumption,
33. See DRAFr CODE art. 6.5.1.2; Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the
Netherlands: General Problems, 17 LA. L. REV. 273, 283 et seq. (1957). For the
method of numbering the articles, see Drion, Introductionto "Unofficial Translation of Book 6" 17 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REV. 225, 231
(1970). For practical purposes every article of the Draft Code is identified by
the number of the book where it is to be found, of the title of the book, of the
chapter (if any), and of its own number in the chapter. In the final text each
book will be separately numbered throughout.
34. Drion, Introduction to "Unofficial Translationof Book 6", 17 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 225, 232 (1970).
35. Cf. TOELICHTING, BOEK 7, 834 (1954).
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donation) and which grant the use of a thing (hire, lease, loan
for use); (2) contracts concerning activities undertaken by one
party on behalf of the other (charge (opdracht),36 publishing
contract, deposit, labor contract, collective labor contract,
contract for a work, partnership); (3) other contracts (surety37 ,
ship, contract of settlement (vaststellingsovereenkomst)
bills of exchange and cheques, and aleatory contracts including insurance). It will be clear from this enumeration what
aims were pursued in compiling Book 7 and what substantial
changes were made compared to the system of our present
codified and statutory law. In accordance with Meijers' intention to bring private law as a whole into one Code, some
contracts which are now classified in separate acts (e.g., lease,
collective labor contract) will be placed in Book 7. Besides,
part of the Commercial Code will be transferred to Book 7 (see
§ 3 (6)). Finally, it contains some new contracts: publishing
contract and the contract of settlement, of which "transaction" in the present Code only forms a species.
6. Mercantile Law
It has been pointed out previously that mercantile law
will be incorporated in the Civil Code. 38 In Book 2, "Juristic
Persons", corporations are dealt with, together with associations and foundations. Book 7 contains the remainder of mercantile law, except for the law of transport, which will be
covered in Book 8. Thus a distinction is abolished which did
not exist in the Dutch provinces before the French revolution: Hugo de Groot, in his "Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence" (1631), deals with subjects of mercantile law together
with civil law. The same was done by other ancient Dutch
authors and even in the draft for the Civil Code which was
made by the Dutch jurist Joannes van der Linden in 1807.
Bringing together civil law and mercantile law is the logical
36. This new concept comprises various contracts, of which mandate is
the most important.
37. This "contract of settlement" encompasses every contract by which
the parties accept a settlement of their legal relationship in order to terminate or to prevent uncertainty or dispute about this relationship. The settlement can be effected by way of a transaction between the parties, but also
by a decision to be taken by one of them or by a third person. This decision
can be set aside on certain conditions when it is found to be contrary to
reasonableness and equity. DRAFT CODE, arts. 7.15.1,7,8.
38. Cf. TOELICHTING, BOEK 1-4, 9-10 (1954).
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outcome of a development which started in 1838. In fact,
article 1 of the Commercial Code provides that, except for
explicit deviations, the Civil Code applies to all subjects dealt
with in the Commercial Code. Also, in 1838 the special Courts
of Commerce, introduced in the Napoleonic era, were
abolished. Subsequently, the law of bankruptcy was taken
from the Commercial Code and arranged in a separate statute, no longer restricted to merchants (1893). Finally in 1934
almost all differences between merchants and others were
banned from private law. Under these circumstances it is no
longer appropriate to arrange civil law and commercial law in
separate Codes.
The new Code will bring considerable changes on many
issues, but it would lead too far afield to go into details here.
By way of example, there are the completely new rules for
such a socially important contract as life assurance: the
seven totally obsolete provisions of the Commercial Code of
1838 will be replaced by some thirty articles adapted to mod39
ern requirements.
7. Law of Industrial and Intellectual Property
It was originally intended to devote the last book of the
Code (Book 9) to the third category of subjective patrimonial
rights: "the rights on the products of the mind". The statutes
containing these rights (at that time: patents, trade mark,
copyright, trade name) were to be split up. The provisions of a
civil character would be included in Book 9, those of an administrative, procedural and penal character were to be
placed elsewhere.
Since then the situation with regard to these rights has
drastically changed. A unification of patent law is being prepared in the Common Market countries. With respect to the
law of trademark a uniform law has been passed and put into
operation for the Benelux 40 ; the same happened this year
withItthe new law of designs and models.
goes without saying that it is impossible
to split up
such uniform acts, as it was initially planned to do with the
national statutes. It would not be elegant however to transfer
these acts as a whole to Book 9 of the Civil Code, since they
39. DRAFT CODE chap. 7.17.3.
40. Benelux is the economic union between Belgium, the Netherlands
and Luxembourg. One of its aims is the unification of parts of private law.
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contain more than private law alone. Moreover, this would
have the practical disadvantage that one and the same article would carry a different number in Book 9 and in the
uniform acts. More important, these acts, which carry their
own provisions for transfer, pledge etc., would badly fit into
the system of the new Code. The once envisaged simplification and the better connection with the codified civil law
would not be attained. For these reasons it is improbable that
Book 9 will be brought out according to the original plan
made for it. Since it would not be very appropriate to limit
Book 9 to a rudimentary form, in which only the law of
copyright and trade name is incorporated, the fate of this
book seems to be sealed. However, an official decision has not
yet been taken.

§ 4.

SOME IMPORTANT INNOVATIONS

General Observations
The commission which Professor Meijers accepted in 1947
was brief: "the drafting of a new Civil Code." This wording
allowed the greatest possible latitude to modify the law in
force and to bring the Civil Code to the level of the day. It is
clear that it was not intended*for the new Civil Code to fundamentally change the existing law as developed by legislation and the courts. On the other hand, the work must not be
misunderstood, like some opponents of the recodification have
contended, as a mere restatement of the law with the aim to
remove superfluous and obsolete provisions, and to codify
judge-made law and statutory law. In the previous section it
has been pointed out that Meijers decidedly did not approach
his task in such a limited way, as far as the classification of
the new Code is concerned. By means of some examples it will
also be shown that the law itself will undergo many important and interesting innovations.
The examples will be restricted to the contents of Books 3
and 6 (general law of the patrimony, and general part of the
law of obligations). To begin with, on account of the parliamentary conclusions devoted to them, three subjects which
already drew attention in foreign literature: the use of movables as security without dispossession of the debtor, the effect
of good faith to modify or extinguish obligations, and the
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judicial power to mitigate damages. 41 These will be followed
by brief discussions of undue influence, unjustified enrichment, and some problems with regard to tortious liability.
1.

Security on Movables without Dispossession of Debtor

In accordance with conclusion 6,42 the draft of Book 3,
published in 1954, introduced the possibility of a "registered
pledge" of business or professional movable assets, established by inscription in a register without delivery of possession. 43 With regard to these assets, also an unregistered nonpossessory right of pledge was proposed, albeit merely as a
security for business debts, with a right which would rank
after both a possessory pledge and a registered pledge."
Since all security interests of a proprietary nature were suppressed elsewhere in the same draft, 45 it would no longer be
possible to constitute a non-possessory46 security over movables other than these business assets.
Neither the Second Chamber, nor the legal profession
expressed satisfaction with this set of provisions. Against the
registered pledge, objections were raised which partially had
already been voiced during the discussions in parliament on
Meijers' preliminary questions. There were fears of unnecessary bureaucratic interference, of all the routine of
officialism entailed by the new registers, and of the injurious
influence this publicity might exert on the debtor's credit41. See Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: Some New Developments in Obligations and Property, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE
AND CONFLICTS LAW 172-89 (Leyden 1961) (a discussion of questions 10, 21,
21A, 3 and 8). See § 4 (1)-(3), infra.
42. Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: Some New Developments in Obligations and Property, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND
CONFLICTS LAW 172, 185 (Leyden 1961).
43. DRAFT CODE, arts. 3.9.3.1-5.
44. Id. art. 3.9.2.2.
45. Id. art. 3.4.2.2, par. 3. For some references on the transfer of movable
property as a security in Dutch law, see Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the
Netherlands: the Fifty Questions, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 595-603 nn. 13-14 (1956).
For a more detailed account see SAUVEPLANNE, SECURITY OVER CORPOREAL
MOVABLES 163 et seq. (Sijthoff, Leyden 1974).
46. According to Meijers, this very limited interpretation of Conclusion 3
was not contrary to the intention of the Second Chamber. See TOELICHTING,
BOEK 1-4, 212 (1954); this opinion proved to be incorrect. See also Dainow,
Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: Some New Developments in Obligations and Property, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW
184 (Leyden 1961).
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rating. Furthermore, it was doubted whether the register
would really create a guarantee for the creditors and other
interested third persons and whether it would not in fact
merely favor the major lenders, because only these were
likely to consult it.
For these reasons the government went back on its intention in the Revised Draft of Book 3 (1971). 47 The registered

pledge has been discarded and replaced by a right of nonpossessory pledge, pertaining to all categories of movable assets and established by an authentic instrument, or a private
document with registered date. If the debtor is not the owner
of the thing or if the thing is already charged with limited
rights, the creditor will only obtain a valid right of pledge
when the thing enters into his (or somebody else's) possession, provided that he relies in good faith on the debtor's
power to dispose of it at that moment.48 Conversely, if the
creditor allows the thing to remain in the hands of the debtor,
a purchaser acquiring possession of it in good faith obtains
full title.4 9 Thus, because of the absence of any publicity, even
of the "publicity" deriving from the fact that the thing has
entered into the possession of someone else than the debtor,
the creditor secured by a non-possessory pledge will have a
rather weak position, just like the present-day fiduciary
owner of movables.
2. Judicial Power to Mitigate Damages
The tenth Conclusion voted in the Second Chamber, regarding the judicial power to mitigate damages50 has resulted
47. For a detailed survey of all the considerations involved, see W. Snijders, Bezitloze zekerheid op roerende zaken, in HONDERD JAAR RECHTSLEVEN
25-39 (Bundel N.J.V.; Zwolle 1970). The author collaborated in the preparation of the Revised Drafts of Books 3 and 5, and is presently Advisor to the

Government for Books 5 and 6.
48. Arts. 3.9.2.2 and 2a of the Revised Draft. Art. 3.9.2.3 contains a

similar rule on pledge of claims.
49. Id. 3.4.2.3a. See note 77, infra.
50. Translation of Conclusion 10: "The judge should be recognized as
having a general power on the ground of special circumstances to mitigate an
obligation to pay damages. This with the reservation that no mitigation is to
be allowed where the debtor has taken out liability insurance, where he was
under obligation to do so or where such coverage is customary." See Dainow,
Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: Some New Developments in Obligations and Property, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW
172, 175 (Leyden 1961); Drion, Introduction to "Unofficial Translation of Book
6", 17 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 225, 234-35 (1970).
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in an article in the chapter on liability for damages, which
reads as follows:
Article 6.1.9.7:
(1) If an award of complete compensation would reduce the debtor to a state of emergency, the court may
mitigate his duty to compensate, unless the damage was
caused through the wilful intent or gross fault of the
debtor.
(2) This power is lacking in so far as the debtor has
not covered his liability with insurance although he was
bound to do so.
(3) Any stipulation at variance with the provision of
the first paragraph is void. 5 '
It is evident that this provision differs from the Conclusion insofar as the power to mitigate the duty of compensation does not depend on special circumstances, like for instance the small degree of fault or even the total absence of it
52
on the part of the debtor. According to the Commentary
such a rule would not comply with the principles of contractual liability in case of non-performance 53 and consequently
would lead to great uncertainty in the law of contract. Since
things are judged to be different with regard to liability in
tort, article 6.3.17 provides that if a person is liable without a
tort being attributable to him, the court may mitigate the
compensation according to the circumstances insofar as the
liability was not covered by insurance and the debtor was not
bound to take out such coverage. Thus, the provision protects
those who are liable for damages caused by persons and
things under their supervision: parents and employers, responsible for their children or employees; those possessing,
using or producing things which cause damage because of
54
unknown defects, and so forth.
This solution was criticized by the Second Chamber in its
Preliminary Report. The Chamber judged it to be too limited
and preferred a provision stating simply that the judge may
mitigate the compensation when such a mitigation would be
reasonable and just in view of the special circumstances of
51. Translation from Unofficial Translationof Book 6, 17 NETHERLANDS
INT'L L. REV. 252 (1970).
52. TOELICHTING, BOEK 6, 565, 702 (1954).
53. DRAFT CODE, arts. 6.1.8.1-3. For discussion of art. 6.1.8.2, see §5 (3) (c).
54. See also §4 (6).
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the case. Moreover, the exception which article 6.1.9.7 contains for damage caused through the wilful intent or gross
fault of the debtor was considered inappropriate in the case of
a disinterested debtor who commits a gross fault while giving
his gratuitous services to the creditor. 55 Another objection
which may be raised against the drafted rules is the possibility of a concursus of liabilities, notably of those based on
non-performance of a contractual duty and on tort. In order
to prevent difficulties created by such a concurrence, it is
desirable to harmonize the legal consequences of all obligations to pay compensation for damages, which is precisely the
aim of the new chapter 6.1.9. A special power to mitigate damages in the field of tortious liability without fault would be
hardly compatible with this purpose. The Revised Draft will
again have to take a position on this problem.
3. Effect of Good Faith
Conclusion 21, stating that the law should provide that
good faith not only can supplement obligations arising from
contract, but also can extinguish them or exclude their application, 56 has been amply elaborated in the draft of Book 6.
Article 6.1.1.2 provides that "the parties to an obligation are
bound towards each other to conduct themselves in accor5' 7
dance with the dictates of reasonableness and equity.
Paragraph 2 adds that "a creditor cannot exercise his right
insofar as, in the given circumstances, he would be acting
reprehensibly in holding the debtor to his duty." This provision applies to all obligations, whereas the present Civil Code
restricts the operation of good faith to obligatory contracts
and attributes to it only the first of the two functions mentioned in the Conclusion cited above.
55. In this case, DRAFT CODE, art. 6.4.1.2 par. 2 (negotiorum gestio) also
allows mitigation of the liability of the gestor.
56. See Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: Some New Developments in Obligations and Property, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE
AND CONFLICTS LAW 177 et seq. (Leyden 1961).
57. In the law of obligations, the term "good faith" will be replaced by
''reasonableness and equity." The concept of good faith will be maintained in
its "subjective function," e.g., in the law of things (a person who in good faith
relies on somebody else's authority to dispose of a thing, etc.). In the same
way, the German Civil Code distinguishes between "Treu und Glauben" (art.
242) and "guter Glauben," (e.g., art. 932) the Italian Civil Code distinguishes
between "regole della correttezze" (art. 1175) and "buonafede" (e.g., art. 1153).
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The effect of good faith as to the law of contract is dealt
with in some articles contained in chapter 6.5.3, regarding the
legal effects of contracts. Articles 1 and 10 of this chapter
extend the principles, as expressed in article 6.1.1.2, to the
legal consequences of contracts, obligatory as well as all other
contracts in the field of the law of things and the law of
obligations; and according to article 6.5.1.6 these rules are
applicable per analogiamto all other multilateral juristic acts
with a patrimonial content.
The same is true of article 6.5.3.11 which elaborates Conclusion 21A 58 regarding the "impr~vision." The first phrase of
this article reads: "The court may at the suit of one of the
parties vary a contract or set it aside in whole or in part on
account of unforeseen circumstances which are of such a nature that the other party is not entitled to expect, according
to standards of reasonableness and equity, that the contract
should be maintained unchanged." Similar provisions have
been drafted in several other parts of the new Civil Code.5 9
4.

Undue Influence

Just like the Code Napoleon (art. 1118), the Dutch Civil
Code explicitly rejects the doctrine of iustum pretium: persons of the age of majority are not entitled to relief from their
contracts by reason of lesion (art. 1486). This means that,
apart from some specific cases mentioned in the Code, lesion
does not play a role in Dutch law as a separate criterion for
the annulment of juristic acts. Minors can ask relief from the
contracts they have entered into without the assistance of
their legal representatives (again apart from some exceptions); contrary to French law, it is not required that they
58. See Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands: Some New Development8 in Obligations and Property, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE
AND CONFLICTS LAW 172, 179 (Leyden 1961).

59. Two of these, concerning the contracts of alimentation, have already
been enacted DRAFT CODE, book 1, art. 159 par. 3, and art. 401 par. 3. The
others concern, for example, fiduciary administration as constituted by a
juristic act (art. 3.6.2.2, par. 3), the contract regarding the administration of a
"gemeenschap" (art. 3.7.1.2, par. 3), legacies (art. 4.4.2.5a), testamentary
charges (art. 4.4.3.3), the rights of servitude (art. 5.6.8), and hereditary tenure
(art. 5.7.1.8a). See id. art. 6.5,3.12 in connection with art. 6.5.3.4. In general, on
the rule of good faith ("reasonableness and equity") in the new law of obligations, see Drion, Introduction to "Unofficial Translation of Book 6," 17
NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 235-36 (1970).
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should have suffered a financial loss. The same applies to the
annulment of contracts on account of defects of consent (error, fraud, violence).
This limitation of the grounds for legal relief has long
been criticized in the Netherlands. Many authors insisted
upon the necessity of introducing a form of legal relief in the
case of undue influence. Responding to this appeal, the draft
of Book 3 of 1954, in accordance with the affirmative Conclusion of the Second Chamber,6" contained a provision which
recognizes "abuse of circumstances" as a ground for annulment if somebody has been induced by these circumstances to
perform a disadvantageous juristic act. A number of relevant
circumstances was enumerated in the draft: a situation of
necessity, dependence, levity, abnormal state of mind, lack of
experience. These examples make clear that the circumstances which may be taken advantage of not only include economic or factual necessity, but also a particular
state of mind of the injured party. 6 1
It will be clear that the Draft Civil Code does not introduce a modernized version of iustum pretium. Undoubtedly,
the possibility of pecuniary losses has led to the drafting of
the new provision, but nevertheless it is not the prejudice
which determines the avoidance of the juristic act but the
fact that certain circumstances have been taken undue advantage of. This results from the very context in which the
rule has been placed: it is inserted in the same article as
fraud and violence, and financial loss is not required for the
avoidance of juristic acts on account of defects of consent.
Accordingly Meijers' Commentary states 62 that the prejudice
contemplated in the provision will normally be of a patrimonial nature, without however (no more than in the case of
violence) necessarily being restricted to it. To bring out this
intention more clearly, the reference to the disadvantageous
nature of the legal act, performed under the influence of
abuse of circumstances, has been suppressed in the Revised
Draft of 1971. This alteration complies perfectly with the development of judicial law since the publication of the draft of
Book 3; this will be mentioned further in § 5(3)(b).
60. Conclusion 19. See Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands:
the Fifty Questions, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 595-606 (1956).
61. "Memorandum in Reply," Book 3, p. 61.
62. TOEUCHTING, BOEK 1-4, 192 (1954).
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Unjust Enrichment

Neither the Code Napol6on nor the Dutch Civil Code contains a general provision obliging a person who has been
unjustifiably enriched at the expense of another to make good
the other's loss. Many authors have advocated the desirability of recognizing such a liability, based on unwritten law.
Several arguments could be advanced in favor of this view.
The existing Code contains a number of provisions imposing a
duty of restitution in specific cases of enrichment. An important argument can be drawn from legal history: it is certain
that Roman-Dutch law recognized the general action for unjust enrichment; 63 thus it may be argued that, the Civil Code
being silent on the subject, this rule has never been abrogated and consequently still obtains today. Moreover, reference can be made to the law in a number of surrounding
countries: in France and Belgium the rule has been introduced by judge-made law;6 4 in Germany, Switzerland and

Italy it has been expressly set forth in the Civil Code. 65 In
spite of these arguments the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) has refused to recognize the general action
66
for unjust enrichment as a part of the existing law.
The new Civil Code will modify this situation. Art. 6.4.3.1
provides: "Anyone who has been unjustifiably enriched at the
expense of another is bound, insofar as is reasonable, to make
good the other's loss to the extent of his enrichment. Insofar
as the enrichment has decreased in the period during which
the person enriched had no reasonable need to reckon with6 7a
duty to make good the loss, it is not taken into account."
The Commentary6 8 remarks that an enrichment is not
unjustified if it results for instance from a juristic act. If the
63. J.E. Scholtens, "The General Enrichment Action That Was," 83 S.
AFR. L. J. 391-402 (1966).
64. France: Cass. req. June 15, 1892, D.1892.1.596; S. 1893.1.281 note
Labb6. See CAPITANT, WEILL & TERRP, LES GRANDS ARRtTS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE CIVLE, no. 153. Belgium: Cass. req. May 27, 1939, Pas. 1909, I, 272.

65. Germany: BGB arts. 812 et seq.; Switzerland: O.R. arts. 62 et seq.;
Italy: C. CIV. arts. 2041 et seq.
66. H.R. (Hoge Raad) Jan. 30, 1959, N.J. (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie)

1959, no. 548 (Quint vs. te Poel). Cf. Drion, Introduction to "Unofficial Translation of Book 6," 17 NETHERLANDS INT'L REV. 223 (1970). See note 77,
infra.

67. Cf. Conclusion 18; Dainow, Civil Code Revision in the Netherlands:
the Fifty Questions, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 605 (1956).
68. TOELICHTING, BOEK 6, 730 (1954).
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obligations arising from a contract of sale are not equivalent,
one of the parties is enriched at the expense of the other, but
this enrichment is justified because it is based on the contract.
Thus. it will not be possible to reintroduce the doctrine of
iustum pretium (§ 4 (4)) on the basis of unjust enrichment.
Statute law, too, can justify a patrimonial advantage: for
example, the possessor in good faith may retain the fruits he
had perceived. The addition "insofar as is reasonable" makes
it possible to exclude, inter alia,,the restitution of an enrichment forced upon somebody without his consent. The following example is often mentioned in this connection. I have my
neighbor's house painted during his absence, knowing that
he is opposed to it. Under these circumstances it would not be
reasonable to oblige him to reimburse the expenditures I
made. The same holds good for the improvements made in
somebody else's property by a malafide possessor. As in many
other instances in the new Civil Code, the draft provision
allows the courts a large discretion to develop the law, while
taking into account the actual circumstances of each case and
the contents and purport of the applicable statutory and contractual provisions.
6.

Torts

The law of tortious liability, at present governed by some
provisions of the Code and elaborated by judicial law,69 will be
set forth in title 6.3 of the new Civil Code. In accordance with
legal developments in many other countries, the most important alterations in this area consist in the shift from liability
based on fault to liability based on risk. The latter is not
unknown in the existing law, but is mainly restricted to the
vicarious liability for damage caused by employees, by the
collapse of buildings, by vessels and (with some important
restrictions) by motorcars. Furthermore, there are cases in
which liability is based on fault but with the burden of proof
reversed. Thus, parents are liable for torts committed by
their children, unless they prove that the omission to take
such measures for the prevention of loss to third persons as
could reasonably have been required of them, cannot be imputed to them. But unlike French law, the courts have not
69. DRAFT CODE, arts. 1401 et seq. For a complete survey of the judicial
law (and the legal literature) on these articles; see Drion et al, ONRECHTMATIGE DAAD (losbladig) (Kluwer-De venter).
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deduced a liability based on risk from the article governing
70
the liability for things.
Against this position the new Civil Code will provide a
liability for "hazardous" things and materials, regardless of
whether damages caused by defects of these things or materials can be attributed to the fault of their possessor or user
(arts. 6.3.15 and 16). A different position is taken as regards
product liability: here the producer will be liable for damages
caused by unknown defects unless he proves that the defect
was due neither to his own fault or to that of another who at
his orders was engaged on the product, nor to the failure of
the appliances used by him (art. 6.3.13).
Since the publication of the draft of Book 6, the number of
those advocating a more severe liability has increased, notably with regard to the liability of parents for their children
and of producers for their products. Since in modern society
the views on liability in tort are subject to rapid development,
it is not improbable that the Revised Draft of Book 6 will
bring other innovations in this field.
§ 5.

INFLUENCE ON LEGAL SCIENCE AND LEGAL PRACTICE

The draft of the new Civil Code is not merely a piece of
work which will be completed and introduced in due time,
leaving the legal practice untouched until that moment. On
the contrary, the influence of the drafts and explanatory
commentaries-the first ones having been published some
twenty years ago-on Dutch legal practice has been considerable. To give an impression of the extent to which the draft
casts its shadows ahead, the following observations indicate
its relation to legislation, legal literature and, perhaps most
interesting of all, to judicial law.
1. Legislation
In the Netherlands the correct position has always been
taken that the preparation of the new Civil Code should not
stand in the way of alterations of the law which cannot await
its completion. Of course one has to be more prudent with
partial alterations when recodification is on the way; the civil
law does require a certain amount of stability so that alterations should not be produced in rapid succession. It is obvious
70. Cf. Drion, Introduction' to "Unofficial Translation of Book 6," 17
NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 233 (1970).
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that new legislation, if only for this reason, should be in
harmony as much as possible with the new Civil Code.
The influence of the new Civil Code is greatest when, as
happened various times, parts of it are introduced separately.
The following examples may be given in illustration: the legal
capacity of the married woman, adoption and the rules for
foundations. As mentioned in § 2, Book 1 (law of persons and
family law) has been recently put into operation as a whole;
Book 2 (juristic persons) will follow soon.
On the other hand, there may be a partial alteration of
the law which cannot be modeled on provisions of the new
Civil Code. It is desirable that in such cases the subject concerned should not be changed again, or changed as little as
possible, on the introduction of the new Code; this requires
that the terminology and the system of the new Civil Code
should be taken into account as much as possible. Both
methods lead to the result that rules and concepts of the new
Civil Code exert their influence, either directly or indirectly
on legal practice by way of this "partial" legislation. Thus
when terms, and concepts of the new Code enter into the
legislation by way of partial changes of the law, it is obvious
that their meaning should be defined with regard to the context in which they appear elsewhere in the Draft. 71
Apart from exercising influence on the contents of the
new legislation, the Draft Code may set the pace at which it is
brought about, especially when the legislator can make use of
already completed drafts. Practice has shown that this
applies not only to national legislation but also to international treaties. In the Benelux unification program it has
happened several times that a text could be drafted much
more quickly because of the already existing draft of the new
Dutch Code. This equally holds good if the draft is deviated
from, since the preparatory work on the Code can be of benefit anyway, notably from the study of comparative law underlying each part of the new Code.
2. Legal Science
The influence exerted by the new Code on legal writing is
71. Notably the putting into operation of Book 1 is of importance, for
example, for the new terminology regarding "assets" and "things" (cf. note
22, supra), the "limited rights" (cf. note 21, supra), the term "registered
goods" (cf. note 23, supra), and for the expression "reasonableness and
equity" replacing the concept of "good faith" (cf. note 57, supra).
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considerable. In the field of private law, there are no
textbooks and almost no other publications in which the new
Code is disregarded. Some manuals already treat their subject matter on the basis of the system of the not-yetintroduced books of the Draft Code. The number of writings
which specifically submit the drafts to a critical inquiry is
large. There exists a (certainly incomplete) survey of literature on the subject numbering over 200 pages. Few barristers
neglect the opportunity to plead their cases on the basis of
the new law, if this can be of avail to a greater chance of
success. All this information regarding the new Code has its
marked effect upon the courts; this will be discussed presently.
Indirectly, the Draft has given an impulse to the study of
comparative law. Naturally, interest in this subject is not
new in the Netherlands. In view of the provenance of our
Civil Code it is obvious that in the past century much interest
was devoted to the development of French law. This was
followed by a period of increasing influence of German and
Swiss legal scholarship, notably at the time when in those
countries new Codes were drafted and put into operation.
Presently, interest in Common Law is also growing. 72 Repeatedly, judicial decisions (including those of the Hoge Raad)
have been influenced by foreign law. A good example of this
"harmonizing interpretation" is furnished by a decision of
the Supreme Court of 1943, 73 in which the court considered
"that, in accordance with what has of old been accepted in
our country, and with what is nowadays accepted in
neighboring countries under statutory or judicial law, compensation for non-material damage (in casu caused by a car
crash) must be considered reasonable and just."
The interest in comparative law can be found in the new
Code in a very pronounced form, notably in the law of obligations. It would lead too far afield to discuss the impact of
foreign law on specific provisions or chapters, or to go into the
question of what legal system exercised the greatest
influence on the draft as a whole. Just one figure might indi72. Cf. Drion, Introduction to "Unofficial Translation of Book 6," 17
NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 228 (1970).
73. H.R. May 21, 1943, N.J. 1943, 445 (van Kreuningen vs. Bessem). For
an ample discussion of this case, see Kisch, Statutory Constructionin a New
Key: Harmonizing Interpretation, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND
CONFLICTS LAW 262 et seq. (1961).
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cate, however, the extent to which foreign law has been taken
into consideration. Pages 638-672 of the Commentary on Book
6, being exactly half of the explanatory commentary of title
6.3 (tort), contain 220 notes; 120 of these include references to
statutory law, court decisions and literature of the following
countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Switzerland, Hungary, England, the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Portugal, Canada, the United States of America,
South Africa and Japan.7 4 It is not surprising that also in
legal literature, which generally examines the draft very
closely, ever more attention is being paid to foreign law; the
same applies to university teaching.
3. Judge-made Law
Very significant is the attitude assumed by the courts
towards the draft of the new Civil Code. In the Netherlands,
the interesting phenomenon can be observed that judge-made
law is clearly influenced by the Draft and that this influence
increases as the legislative activities are proceeding.7 5 In the
process of judicial development of the law, the draft is continuously being taken into account. In a number of cases this
has resulted in an interpretation of statutory rules complying
with solutions adopted in the Draft or in the Explanatory
Commentaries, a mode of construction for which the telling
term of "anticipating interpretation" has been found.
It is clear that there are certain limits to this kind of
interpretation. The judge may not set aside a rule of compulsory law, while invoking a drafted provision.7 6 From this it
74. There are also references to the history of law, both to domestic and
foreign writers and legislation.
75. Cf. C.J. van Zeben, Een koperen feest (inaugural address Utrecht,
1966); G.J. Scholten, Anticiperende interpretatie: een nieuwe interpretatiemethode?, W.P.N.R. (Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notarisambt en
Registratie) 5031, 5032 (1969). The phenomenon is not wholly new in the
Netherlands. In 1919 the Supreme Court drew a most important definition of
tort from a draft statute (presently taken over in its essentials in DRAFr
CODE, art. 6.3.1, par. 2). That draft had thus fulfilled its function and was
never enacted.
76. Compulsory law cannot be put aside, except for striking exceptions.
Thus the Supreme Court ruled in 1972 (H.R. March 3, 1973, N.J. 1972, no. 339;
La Confiance vs. Maring) that some provisions in our very obsolete law of
insurance (cf. §3 (6), supra)have lost their force, because they are at variance
with incompatible custom ("abrogating custom"). Equally, good faith can
exclude the application of compulsory provisions, but only in special cases.
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can be understood that the law of obligations offers the
majority of examples of "anticipating interpretation," the law
of persons and family law very few, while the law of things
takes an intermediate position. Nor will the judge draw such
rules from the Draft Civil Code whose application requires
the legislative creation of new institutions like registers or
other official devices. The same holds good for rules7which do
not fit in with the system of the law as it stands."
In spite of these limitations the courts have been able, by
means of anticipating interpretation, to introduce a number
of important rules into the body of the existing law. The
following illustrations are limited to decisions of the Supreme
Court (Hoge Raad) and, within this scope, to decisions in
which the influence of the draft is evident or at least highly
probable. Whether this influence has indeed been exerted can
not always be ascertained beyond doubt, since the Hoge Raad
(contrary to the lower courts) never refers explicitly either to
legal literature or the draft or the explanatory commentaries. 7 8 For this reason it is not possible for instance to
establish, in cases in which the court maintains an existing
rule, whether this was so decided on the ground that the rule
also complies with the new Code, whereas it otherwise would
have chosen a different solution. On the other hand, it is
conceivable that the court might decide contrary to the existing law and in harmony with the draft, where it might have
taken the same decision under the influence of legal literature or of foreign law if the draft had not existed. Yet, the
influence of the draft in such cases is highly probable, although strictly speaking it cannot be proved. However this
may be, the influence is certain when the Hoge Raad, as
happened already several times, adopts in its decision a wording occurring verbatim or nearly literally in the draft.
(a) In 1950 the Hoge Raad in one judgment decided two
77. This may have been an important consideration for the Supreme

Court when denying the existence of the general action for unjustified enrichment (see note 64, supra). Many rules in the new Civil Code are attuned
to this general provision and it has been continuously taken into account by
the drafters of the Code. The introduction of so general a rule into the
present law could lead to many unforeseen consequences.
78. In a recent case (H.R. February 2, 1973, N.J. 1973, no. 315; Corporation of Amsterdam vs. Jumbo) the plaintiff raised the question whether art.
6.3.13 (product liability, see §4 (6)) could be considered as an already operative
rule; the Supreme Court was able to leave this question unanswered on
procedural grounds.
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questions which had been disputed since the enactment of the
Civil Code of 1838.7 9 In the first, it adopted the so-called
causal system for the transfer of property, that is, it ruled
that the title required by article 639 of the Civil Code for the
transfer of property should be a valid obligatory relationship
(e.g., a contract of sale); a title existing only in the imagination of the parties (causa putativa) was considered not to be
sufficient. Secondly, the vague provision of article 2014 par.
1, taken from article 2279 of the Code Napol6on ("with regard
to movables, possession is equivalent to title"), was construed
in the sense that a person who acquires a movable thing in
good faith from someone who is not entitled to dispose of it, is
protected by law, so that he obtains the property of the thing.
Both rules are in accordance with Book 3 of the Draft,8 0
which was not published until four years later. It is generally
held that the solutions Meijers intended to establish in the
draft were already known to the Supreme Court in 1950, so
that we find here an anticipating interpretation "avant la
lettre".
(b) In § 4 (4) above, there is mentioned article 3.2.10 of the
new Code which introduces the possibility of relief from juristic acts on account of abuse of circumstances (undue
influence). In 1957 the relevance of abuse of circumstances
was recognized by the Hoge Raad.8 ' In the case submitted to
the court, one party to a contract had been compelled to
accept a very onerous stipulation because the other party
was in a monopolistic position. The Hoge Raad recognized in
principle that a contract by which the injured party has accepted a highly unreasonable burden on account of compelling circumstances which the other party has taken advantage of, may be void, being contrary to boni mores. This construction differs from the one set out in the draft; apparently
the court considered itself incompetent to introduce new
forms of legal relief on account of defects of consent. But the
79. H.R. May 5, 1950, N.J. 1951, no. 1 (Damhof vs. the State of the Netherlands).

80. DRAFT CODE arts. 3.4.2.2, par. 2; 3.4.2.3a. It may be noted in passing
that in the Revised Draft, contrary to the law currently in force, the latter
provision extends its protection to the gratuitous transferee as well as to the
purchaser of lost and stolen goods. However, in all cases the original owner
will be entitled to sue the purchaser in a personal action and to claim that
the property of the thing be transferred to him, provided that he is willing to
restore the purchaser's price. This claim is lost after three years.
81. H.R. Jan. 11, 1957, N.J. 1959, no. 37 (Uijting en Smits vs. Mozes).
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result is unmistakably inspired by the draft, as appears also
from the wording of the decision. In a later judgment8 2 the
Hoge Raad ruled that abuse of circumstances does not require a certain form or amount of prejudice, which means
that a financial prejudice is not essential.
Not only does the draft influence judge-made law, but the
contrary may happen as well: in the Revised Draft of Book 3,
the reference to the disadvantageous nature of the juristic
act performed under undue influence has been suppressed.
(c) With regard to contractualliability, the courts (including the Supreme Court) and the text writers nearly unanimously accepted the general rule that a debtor, irrespective of
fault, is liable for damages caused by defects of the
appliances, equipment and other things used by him while
performing his obligations. The draft of Book 6 takes a different stand. In the Commentary, 3 so comprehensive a rule is
considered to be untenable; for example, because a doctor
may not be held liable on the sole ground that a serum delivered by a pharmaceutical factory later proves to be defective. Thus the debtor's liability for appliances is governed by
the general principle of article 6.1.8.2, which provides that the
shortcoming (viz., in the performance of an obligation) cannot
be attributed to the debtor (with the effect that he is not
bound to make good the damage suffered by the creditor), if it
is due neither to his fault nor to a cause for whigh he is liable
by virtue of statute, a juristic act or opinions prevailing in
society.
Accordingly, the Hoge Raad ruled in 196884 that the
debtor's liability for defective appliances should be governed
by the nature of the contract, the opinions prevailing in society, and by reasonableness. The case concerned a small
transport contractor who had undertaken to hoist up a wing
of an airplane from a ship onto a wagon. Because of a defect
of the hoisting-crane, not due to the fault of the debtor, the
wing fell on the ground and was seriously damaged. The
debtor was not held liable for the damage. The Hoge Raad
considered inter alia that on account of the smallness of the
recompense it would be unreasonable to put the risk of such a
large damage on the debtor, and that from the circumstance
82. H.R. May 26, 1964, N.J. 1965, no. 104 (Van Elmbt vs. Feierabend).
83. TOELICHTING, BOEK 6, 541 (1954).

84. H.R. Jan. 5, 1968, N.J. 1968, no. 102 (Zentveld vs. Assicurazioni Generali); cf. H.R. Dec. 13, 1968, N.J. 1969, no. 174 (Cadix vs. A.E.H.).
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that the creditor (the aviation-works) had covered this risk by
insurance it may be inferred that according to opinions prevailing in society the risk should be borne by the creditor.
(d) In several older decisions8 5 the Supreme Court had
held that the using of one's property will only constitute
abuse of right and consequently entail liability in tort if the
owner exercises his right without a reasonable interest and
with the mere intention to harm another person. Thus, as
soon as the owner has any interest of his own, small as it may
be, he is not bound to take into consideration another's prejudice, great as this may be. This narrow and individualistic
view was severely criticized by the legal authors. One of the
critics was Meijers, who afterwards expressed his opinion in
article 8 of the Preliminary Title. This article forbids the
abuse of rights and provides that a right is abused if it is used
either with the mere intention to harm another person, or
with the aim to pursue another object than that for which the
right has been granted, or finally because of the disproportion
between the interest served and the interest affected according to standards of reasonableness. In a case submitted to the
Hoge Raad in 197086 a person had built a garage which extended 30 inches beyond his property. The neighbor sued for
removal of the garage, invoking his right of ownership of the
land. The Hoge Raad in its decision adopted almost literally
the third instance of abuse of right mentioned in article 8 of
87
the Preliminary Title.
So much for the examples of "anticipating interpretation," which might easily be multiplied.
What explains this inclination of the courts to follow the
draft? An answer is offered by Professor Scholten who gives
four motives for anticipating interpretation:88 "First, because
a new Civil Code is considered as an important desideratum.
The purpose has, as it were, been set constitutionally. We
desire to achieve this end and this desire also governs the law
in force. Secondly, because the drafters have great authority,
more than just a scientific authority, since they have been
85. H.R. March 13, 1936, N.J. 1936, no. 415 (van Stolk vs. Van der Goes);
H.R. Dec. 2, 1937, N.J. 1938, no. 353 (Teunissen vs. Driessen).
86. H.R. April 17, 1970, N.J. 1971, no. 89 (Kuipers vs. de Jongh).
87. As a matter of fact, this did not prevent the success of the action on
procedural grounds irrelevant in this context.
88. See note 75, supra. See also W.C.L. van der Grinten, De betekeni8 van
de herzieningsarbeidvoor de rechtsontwikkeling, in HET ONTWERP B.W., 55-66
(Deventer-Antwerpen 1961).

1090

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

commissioned by the government to draft the Code and since
the draft passed a great number of collaborators and critics.
Thirdly, on account of the form in which the drafted rules lie
ready to be applied as legal provisions. This point is very
important: legal literature never lies ready in the same way.
The judge need not find the required formulation himself.
And the fourth reason for anticipating interpretation is that
it will facilitate the transition to the new Civil Code."

